Saturday, September 14, 2019

Postscript For Our National Notice “How Trustworthy Is Robert Mueller?” Series: A NY Post Article “Robert Mueller Helped Saudi Arabia Cover Up Its Role in 9/11 Attacks” Evokes Consideration Of The Strange FBI/Saudi Khobar Towers Bombing Investigation

Appearing above in the end: former FBI Director Louis Freeh, Saudi Prince Bandar ("Bush"), and Robert Mueller- Read about the peculiar investigations that connect them
This article started out as, and is essentially, the postscript I wrote for the last article in a three-part series of articles all addressing a very serious question: How trustworthy is Robert Mueller and his Russiagate report?  The three articles provide an in depth profile and history of Mr. Mueller and his career (including his frequent collaborations and overlaps with William Barr) very different from what you think you might know from reading Mr. Mueller’s Wikipedia page.  See:
It’s Now A Three-Part Series: How Trustworthy Is Robert Mueller and His Russiagate Report?
Two days after I finished that last article, The New York Post published an article I couldn't ignore or avoid referencing in the series since it was one more example of Robert Mueller impeding investigations; this time it was about Robert Mueller helping Saudi Arabia cover up its role in the 9/11 attacks.  Researching Mueller and the impediments he threw up to protect the Saudis in that investigation, led me to more research about an investigation that was apparently also impeded by the FBI protecting the Saudis, the Khobar Towers bombing investigation. . .  . Robert Mueller was involved in the unsatisfactory outcome of that investigation as well.

Here then, is the full postscript I felt compelled to write about those two investigations involving apparent manipulations by the FBI to protect the the Saudis.  It also stands up excellently as an article all on its own.

Postscript (09/08/2019):  Two days after I published this article another opinion piece story was published about Mueller in the New York Post that, although it's quite pertinent, is not incorporated in the main body of what I wrote: Robert Mueller helped Saudi Arabia cover up its role in 9/11 attacks: suit, By Paul Sperry, September 7, 2019.

The article, reporting on the lawsuit by 9/11 families against Saudi Arabia and at least one affidavit submitted as testimony from a former FBI agent submitted therein says that “former FBI investigators say” Mueller, as head of the FBI, was not appropriately interested in investigating “multiple, systemic efforts by the Saudi government to assist the hijackers in the lead-up to the 9/11 attacks” that they uncovered, that “also involved foreign intelligence officers,” and that “the record shows” Mueller “covered up evidence pointing back to the Saudi Embassy and Riyadh — and may have even misled Congress about what he knew.”

That:
Mueller threw up roadblocks in the path of his own investigators working the 9/11 case, while making it easier for Saudi suspects to escape questioning, multiple case agents told me. Then he deep-sixed what evidence his agents did manage to uncover, according to the 9/11 lawsuit against the Saudis. 
FBI Agent Mark Wauck said, Mueller, who used to be his boss, has a long history of acting as a “servant of the deep state,” or the permanent DC ruling class, and, in the article, another former US counterintelligence official is reported to assert: “Bottom line is, Mueller did not do an investigation on people involved in the 9/11 attacks who were connected to the Saudi government, . . . . he was not interested in investigating [Saudi] terrorists who murdered Americans.”

The article includes seven bulleted paragraphs providing more details fleshing out this picture more fully.
  
Khobar Towers Apartment Complex Bombing Research Update.  In addition, the New York Post article (partly through Zero Hedge  and some articles in it by Eric Zuesse with links I researched) led me to more investigation respecting the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers apartment complex.  As noted in the body of my own article, Mueller, as deputy attorney general, directed that bombing to Comey, for prosecution in Virginia.  The investigation and ensuing prosecution continued well into the era that Mueller was heading the FBI.  It turns out to be another investigation where probably obscurant FBI involvement seems to have been extremely unhelpful in determining the truth.

The story of the FBI investigation of Khobar Towers bombing also necessarily deeply involves Mueller's boss when it happened, FBI Director Louis Freeh, and Freeh's top-level coordination with top Saudis in shaping the investigation and the official story.  Freeh was FBI Director until June 21, 2001.  Mueller took over as the next appointed FBI Director.

In 2006, the Washington Post reported the ruling of a federal judge in the case in Virginia that Iran was responsible for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing.  The theory of the ruling was that the Iranian government “financed and directed the bombing by a militant Saudi wing” of the Islamist terrorist group Hezbollah.  The judge’s ruling ordered Iran to pay $254 million to the families of the Americans who died in the attack.  The judge, Royce C. Lamberth, said that "overwhelming" evidence had been presented and that the  “totality of the evidence at trial . . . firmly establishes” Iran’s responsibility.   The judge’s finding was based on a trial without any Iranian participation.  Iran insisted it had “no connection to the bombing.”  The ruling about the “overwhelming evidence” required reversal of “a lower magistrate judge who said evidence linking the Iranian government to the bombing was not convincing.”

And the timing of the ruling came just as the Bush administration was resisting “recommendations that it engage in diplomatic talks with Iran” with hopes to “enlist Iran's help in stabilizing Iraq and the Middle East.”   The effect of the ruling, said the Washington Post, was to throw up a hurdle for those wanting such obvious benefits of such a “rapprochement with Iran.

But Hezbollah, blamed in the ruling as having a “wing” in Sunni Saudi Arabia, is a Shia Muslim group, and the New York Times, in August of 1996, reported, quite inconsistently with the ruling, that the suspects reported to have confessed to the bombing at that time were (emphasis added) “native Saudis, who are all Sunni Muslims with no outside connections to either Iran or Iraq.”

After Lamberth's 2006 ruling, in 2007, former Defense Secretary William Perry said that the evidence that Iran was behind the bombing, i.e. the “strongly believed” theory of the FBI, was not to his own satisfaction (or at the time President Clinton’s).  Thus was avoided a fairly significant “contingency plan to attack Iran” that would have entailed striking “a number of their military facilities that would have weakened -- substantially weakened ... the Iranian navy and air force.”

It gets more complicated when you next theorize who may have actually been responsible for the bombing.  Perry (speaking in 2007, as noted) theorized “in retrospect” that it was “probably masterminded by Osama bin Laden.”  That was probably an easy to believe theory, easy for many to swallow after 9/11.  Perry was not the only one who so theorized, BUT. . .

In his 2007 interview Perry suggested that Saudi officials “tried to discourage” the theory that the bombing was ordered by Iran, because  the Saudi's “feared what action we would take,” i.e. the contingency plan of the U.S. attacking Iran.  Is that true?  Consideration of whether it is true has to be evaluated in terms of the general hunger the Saudis have had over the years (along with the other members of the triumvirate alliance of Israel and the United States) for militarily expressed hostilities with Iran.

In any event, it is reported that in a number of respects neither the FBI, nor Saudi Arabia were keen to see any investigation or transparency that would bring out the facts of the event, and there is much to consider about reported collaboration between the FBI and Saudi Arabia that suppressed discovery and tended conceal facts in various related investigations.  That extends to concealment of the Saudis' own supportive involvement in terrorism, plus a fair amount of what was likely misdirection in considering Iran as culpable.

Apparently, facts about the involvement of Saudi royals and government officials in supporting terrorism (and other corruption and disreputable conduct) was not intended for the eyes of normal FBI agents who could follow up on it and see where it leads.

In 2003 investigative journalist Greg Palast, reported that in 1994 Mohammed Al Khilewi, a Saudi diplomat, defected to the United States “with 14,000 pages of documents from the kingdom’s sealed file cabinets.”  Al Khilewi’s New York lawyer, Michael Wildes, told Palast that FBI agents (two F.B.I. agents and an Assistant United States Attorney) “who came to his office had been ordered not to accept evidence of Saudi criminal activity, even on U.S. soil” and would not take the documents when he said to the FBI, “Here, take the documents! Go get some bad guys with them! We’ll even pay for the photocopying!” Palast’s suggestion is that the order not to accept the documents came from the top, President Clinton.

It’s pretty much agreed that the documents included damning stuff: Investigative journalist Sy Hersh, in a similar account in a 2001 article for the New Yorker described the information as “depicting the Saudi royal family's corruption, human-rights abuses, and financial support for terrorists.”  Hersh says neither Al Khilewi or his lawyer heard anything further from federal authorities, and that Al-Khilewi, granted asylum, was living under cover.  According to a Vanity Fair article, Khilewi said the Saudi royals “responded by threatening his life” and the U.S. government “offered him little protection.”

Hersh’s New Yorker article also said that National Security Agency electronic intercepts of conversations between members of the Saudi Arabian royal family demonstrated to analysts that in “1996 Saudi money was supporting Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda and other extremist groups in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Yemen, and Central Asia, and throughout the Persian Gulf region.”

The controlling interactions between the FBI and the Saudis, in shaping the narratives and allowing facts to surface were handled at the top.  Much of it through Louis Freeh and Prince Bandar (the Saudi Ambassador), who as we'll get on to, had important relationships.  Hersh said in his article that a government expert on Saudi affairs told him that Prince Bandar  "dealt exclusively with the men at the top, and never met with desk officers and the like. "Only a tiny handful of people inside the government are familiar with U.S.-Saudi relations," he explained. "And that is purposeful.""

What couldn't be revealed included the following: According to Hersh's account, American intelligence said the Saudis refused “to help the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. run `traces’—that is, name checks and other background information—on the nineteen men,” most of them from Saudi Arabia, identified as having taken part in the 9/11 attacks.

One of the most pitiful, and at the same time illustrative sagas respecting the Khobar bombing investigation and how the FBI and Saudi's collaborated to shape the narrative they apparently wanted is the story of  Hani al-Sayegh. Much of his story was told in an article by Gareth Porter.

In 1997 Canada arrested Hani al-Sayegh, a 28-year old Saudi, because the Saudis accused him of taking part in the Khobar Towers attack.  To avoid “deportation to Saudi Arabia, where he was believed to face the death penalty” al-Sayegh agreed to a plea bargain: Transferred, instead, to United States he would admit to having proposed “an attack on U.S. personnel, for which he would have to serve up to 10 years in prison.”

However, al-Sayegh was “steadfastly” denying “any knowledge of the Khobar Towers bombing.”  And in fact, he never admitted being involved in taking part of any attack of any kind on U.S. personnel that actually took place.  He admitted only to surveiling sites for the Iranians for possible retaliatory attacks if Iran was attacked.  That notwithstanding, it's reported by Gareth Porter that U.S. officials “supporting the Saudi version of the Khobar story” leaked to the Washington Post a false story* that was published supported with quotes from U.S. and Saudi officials saying that Iran was the "organising force" behind the Khobar bombing, even though, what “al-Sayegh actually told FBI agents in a series of interviews in Ottawa and Washington, however, contradicted the leaked story, according to sources familiar with those interviews.”
(* The article is reported by Gareth Porter is supposed to be dated April 14, 1997, but no such article now seems now to be available on the Washington Post site.  The closest such article appears to be a March 28, 1997 article.  However, ghost text from the article appears to show up on an archive page from The Guardian.  The Wayback Page for the Washington Post, does show that there was, indeed, such an article on that date- see images below- that it was one of the "top stories" in "International News" that day.  The Wayback page has a link for the actual story, but for some reason, clicking it- as opposed to the other stories that can be found that way- brings up an entirely wrong story, which is instead about Zaire.  The internet giveth, and the internet taketh away.)  
Wayback Machine

Top Story in International News!-
Above, information about a disappeared Washington Post article concerning how Clinton may have to go to war? "Iranian Aide Linked To Saudi Bombing Suspect
U.S. and Saudi intelligence authorities have linked a senior Iranian government official to a group of Shiite Muslims suspected of bombing an American military compound in Saudi Arabia last year. If Iran is proven to have been involved, the Clinton administration could be pressured towards military or economic retaliation."
Ultimately, in 1999, the U.S. deported al-Sayegh to Saudi Arabia where the FBI assumed (widely) that he would be beheaded on his return, because Hani al-Sayegh continued to deny “either that he was involved or the Iranians had anything to do with Khobar.”  In other words, al-Sayegh could have saved his life by providing to the U.S. authorities the false admission the U.S. and Saudis apparently wanted badly.

An earlier Washington Post opinion piece observed respecting the lack of potential for justice and truth finding if al-Sayegh was deported:
deporting him to Saudi Arabia might indeed subject him to torture and eventually execution, without ever establishing the truth of his involvement. In fact, serious questions have been raised about the entire Saudi investigation in the Khobar Tower incident. It has been six months since Saudi officials disclosed the arrest of dozens of Saudi Hezbollah supporters for involvement in the barracks bombing. However, the investigation has suffered from lack of support, even within government circles and among those opposed to Hezbollah and other militant groups. Senior Saudi officials privately complain that they are being kept in the dark, the Consultative Council is not involved and no public debate on the bombing has been permitted in the media or elsewhere outside the official line.

Notwithstanding leaks about their guilt, the suspects have not been formally charged. None has been permitted to consult lawyers, although many if not all will face the death penalty when they are formally charged.
Never charged with the crime for lack of evidence, the FBI still listed Hani al-Sayegh was still listed as one of the charged in the indictment in June of 2001.  Gareth Porter astutely observed that the announcement of the indictment, June 21, 2001, was on Freeh’s last day as FBI director.

Even for those who might have once considered al-Sayegh guilty according to the story that was being pushed by the FBI and Saudis, the reasons for sending him back to Saudi Arabia are tough to fathom.  A commentary in Time magazine by Tony Karon when it was happening began: "Run that one by again: The United States doesn't want to try a man suspected of a bomb attack that killed Americans — and they're sending him home?!" 

After the U.S. sent al-Sayegh to his fate with the Saudi's, the Washington Post ran an October 29, 2000 article that was very complimentary about FBI Director Louis Freeh's "global police agency . . . anti-terrorism mission."  The article looked like it had been sourced by Freeh.  It reported that al-Sayegh was given to the Saudis because "Freeh made a secret deal with Saudi Prince Naif, brother of King Fahd."*  "Secret deal?": Not so secret any longer!   . . . To complicate things, there is more than one version of this October 29 article, what is perhaps the original (not now available at the Washington Post Site, "FBI's Uneasy Role: Work in Lands with Brutal Police," currently available from the Orlando Sentinel, "FBI's Uneasy Role: Work in Lands with Brutal Police" with the (bylined "Washington Post") and another "New Global Role Puts FBI in Unsavory Company" (a later edition?- bylined "David A. Vise").  We will work principally with the first, syndicated article, probably the more widely seen one. 
(* Investigative journalist Greg Palast, reported that the law firm- Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld- the law firm of Vernon Jordan, President Clinton’s friend and political adviser, was involved but, so far, I find no trace of a trail to follow up on that.)
The October 29, 2000 article was clever in its `have your cake and eat it too' reporting, perhaps a little too clever.  It cited "Freeh's oft-stated message about the FBI's need to respect 'human dignity' and the tenets of democracy while fighting crime," but this pre-9/11 article managed to argue that returning al-Sayegh for expected torture was probably a good thing.  It explained contextually that al-Sayegh was going "where human-rights groups say torture is routinely used."  (So "human-rights groups say," I guess not the Washington Post itself.The article even managed to put an assessment that torture could be good in the mouth of a Human Rights Watch researcher (Clarisa Bencomo*): "the information that may come out of this is more useful or worthwhile to them than the possibility of this guy being tortured or executed."  Of course that's totally contrary to the fact that it is well understood that the information generated by torturing people tends to be false and highly unreliable; it is far too often what the torturer wants to hear, rather than the truth. 
(* Interestingly, Ms. Bencomo had earlier, rather contradictorily, provided her observation in the Washington Post about Mr. al-Sayegh: “The United States . . . did not have sufficient evidence to try him in U.S. courts”and “the last time Saudi Arabia had bombing suspects in custody, it executed them without a trial. . . . No one knows if he is guilty or innocent. Without a fair trial we will never know.” Contradicting the later WaPo article quoting her, she says: “Both U.S. and international law prohibit returning persons to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing they would be in danger of being tortured.”  The import of the WaPo article is that Freeh and the FBI clearly knew of the likelihood of torture, but Ms. Bencomo seems to have been informed by somebody that, at least pretextually that wasn’t the case: “The United States says it received assurances that Mr. Sayegh wouldn't be tortured.” Then she worries that al-Sayegh hasn’t seen a lawyer and might have been.)
The article was interesting in what it suggested the reader might, or might not imagine.  It said that Freeh's pact with the King's brother "permitted FBI agents to watch Hani Al-Sayegh's interrogation through a one-way mirror and submit questions to his Saudi inquisitors, officials familiar with the arrangement said."   But, while setting it up for supposition, the article did not clearly say that FBI agents had actually watched or asked questions as the pact may have permitted.  While it might challenge the squeamish to imagine FBI agents watching torture through a "one-way mirror," the article said "FBI officials say they have seen no indication Al-Sayegh has been tortured"  . . . That's without actually giving the slightest indication of what the reader should be expected to believe the FBI did see or watch, if anything.

The second version of the article says, "A friend of Al-Sayegh says that he has been tortured in prison, an allegation that Saudi officials deny."   The second version of the article, which is longer and may appear more neutral and fully considered without actually being so,  also says, "Saudi officials have denied requests from Amnesty International to visit Al-Sayegh in prison." The second version of the article also has a lot more puffery about just how wonderful Freeh is as a man, and as an FBI agent ("down-to-earth," "high-energy," "likes to go jogging" with the new guys, "a frenetic globe-trotter," "on the cutting edge of technology").  It also credits Freeh with birthing  Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC), and depicts SIOC cheerfully as James Bondian.  There is, of course, much to controvert the flattering portrayal of Freeh: See the May 3, 2001, press release of Judicial Watch speaking of Freeh’s “legacy of corruption” while itemizing instances- Judicial Watch Rejoices at Resignation of FBI Director Louis Freeh.

Something else that disappeared from the internet (via the Wayback machine):  Judicial Watch Rejoices at Resignation of FBI Director Louis Freeh
Rather than include any warning about the consistent unreliability of torture, the Washington Post article said that "Freeh and others argue that the FBI's approach is necessary to save American lives," and that a man who was "the FBI's top agent in Saudi Arabia" said that the FBI was "able to thwart at least a couple of major incidents" with such [torture obtained?] information from the Saudi government.  Stirring is a certain amount of extra blood lust, the second longer version of the article "the FBI is pressing for even greater access" to the results of the sometimes lethal and arbitrary Yemeni interrogations "criticized" by the State Department.  In that longer version, an expert who seemingly implies there could somehow be a reasonably high quotient of "good information" obtained this way says, "They do not ask, 'How did you question them?' They will just ask, 'Is it good information?'"

The article even included an assurance that such involvement of U.S. FBI law enforcement officers with torture ("police tactics, including torture and a lack of due process, that would be barred in the United States") through such "unsavory company" was essentially legal: "U.S. law does not prohibit the bureau from developing close ties with foreign governments whose practices, laws and ethics differ dramatically from those in the United States." 

This pre-9/11 Washington Post article, venturing all this post-9/11 rhetoric ends, not only by saying that despite "the moral issues posed," FBI officials say this is what they need to fight terrorism effectively, it goes on to say it's needed to address the "complex challenge of pursuing an international terrorist such as Osama bin Laden."  "Osama bin Laden"?  The second longer version of the article saw even further into the future, explaining, "bin Laden is the head of an anti-Western radical Islamic movement that experts say would survive even if he were killed or captured."

Will these torture interrogation yield at least a few confessions?  The longer version of the Washington Post article communicates that al-Sayegh departed for Canada as "as Saudi authorities began rounding up hundreds of members of the Shiite minority," with "200 people being incarcerated and tortured for the same attack."  . .  If you remember, in "Casablanca," "Round up the usual suspects," was code for `we are going to pass over the actual perpetrator.'   In the Unites States, when we seek such a semblance that our police and peace officers aren't letting crimes go unsolved we tend to round up hapless black and brown people.


Let's back up to remember also that in 1996, the New York Times was reporting that Saudi officials said that they had evidence linking some of the detainees to the four men who were condemned and beheaded the previous November in connection with the bombing in Riyadh (five Americans and two Indians were killed).  So again, with their beheading, that information and ability to test the evidence was lost.  In the same article the Times was saying that it was "reported, and then denied by the Saudis, that six Saudi Muslim fundamentalists, all former Afghan-trained fighters, had confessed to carrying out the June [Khobar] bombing"; that it was "confirmed that dozens of Saudi men are indeed being detained and questioned intensively," but "'As far as I know, Prince Nayef is keeping the Americans away from all the details at this point,'' he said. ''But we are sure the young men have indeed confessed to the bombing, - that Saudi authorities ''are still refusing to let United States investigators see the suspects.''

After Louis Freeh left the FBI one of the questionable things he went on to do was represent Saudi Prince Bandar ("Bandar Bush"), the Saudi Ambassador in connection with the British-based BAE/ a.k.a. British Aerospace arms trafficking and bribery investigation that U.S. prosecutors at the Justice Department Justice Department are said to have initiated in May of 2008.  Whenever he might have been hired, Freeh was out in the open representing his client Bandar's interests in a March 19, 2009 interview aired April 7, 2009, as part of a Frontline film “Black Money”  (transcript available online). 

The Frontline film was about what was presented as the “shadowy” world of bribery; the “concealed, camouflaged, a whole world of conduct that rarely sees the light of day” where  “You get pots of black money that nobody sees, nobody has to account for, . . . you can do anything you like with.”  That included Bandar's participation in such shadowy transaction, in one specific case to the tune of $2 billion.

The Frontline film seemed to assure that a crackdown on that world was then being initiated.  Freeh's freakish representation of Bandar in the film was there to be observed by alert viewers as what was perhaps a conflict of interest.  Frontline provided a supplemental web page extending its exchanges with Freeh about Bandar, which has comments posted by the public reacting to it that are worth reading.  The interview was a few years after the suspect 2006 court ruling on the Khobar Towers bombing backing the ultimately suspect FBI/Saudi theory that blamed Iran, but comments hearkened back to earlier events.  For instance, two of them read in part:
Comment: . . When . . .   your internal counter terrorism chief [goes] to work for the country where most of the hijackers came from, what can you say.

Comment: . . The first time I ever heard of FBI director Freeh was when I watched Frontline's "The Man Who Knew".* In that program he seemed to be the one who was instrumental in getting rid of FBI agent John O’Neill. John O’Neill was the counter-terrorism expert who had been tracking Al Qaeda for six years.
(* Aired October 3, 2002- Transcript online.)

Frontline's supplemental web page has an interesting "FOOTNOTE 5: Exoneration?"  (Note Frontline's question mark.) The footnote basically deals with the fact that Prince Bandar, though his wife, was implicated in funding a number of the men named as 9/11 hijackers.  Demanding some mulling over, it reads:
Freeh says that when the FBI investigated Riggs Bank accounts under the control of Prince Bandar, "...they exonerated our client, Prince Bandar and his family with respect to any money laundering or any terrorist financing, because you remember that was really the focus as to whether two individuals who were Saudis who had connections with two of the [9/11] hijackers were using any monies from those [Riggs Bank] accounts to finance it."

"It was very unusual. In the public statements what they said is they found there was no activity, in the accounts that showed any wrongdoing by my client or members of his family. It's an extraordinary conclusion to make. But the government found no money laundering and no evidence of any terrorist financing and absolved my client and his family, which is a very extraordinary result."

FRONTLINE inquired to the FBI and the U.S. Department of Justice about the "public statements" that "exonerated" Prince Bandar. The FBI responded saying it was unable to locate anything that matched what the former Director was referring to. Inquiries with the Department of Justice were met with instructions to contact the FBI. When asked to provide a copy of a statement or a private letter that may have been sent to him or his client, Mr. Freeh did not respond.

The 9/11 Commission found "no evidence that Saudi Princess Haifa al Faisal [wife of Prince Bandar] provided any funds to the [9/11] conspiracy, either directly or indirectly," but made no further reference to the Riggs Bank accounts or to accusations of money laundering.
Is it a "conflict of interest" for Freeh to represent Prince Bandar, an obvious "revolving door" problem?  Some might view it differently, those who instead see a "consonance of interest" between what the FBI wants and what the Saudis want, a common interest in the story the FBI and the Saudis both want to tell.

Gareth Porter saw Freeh’s subsequent legal defense work for Prince Bandar, appearing in the British case about the arms trafficking bribery, as connected to what was, in metaphorical terms, Freeh’s role, while FBI director, as Bandar and the Saudis’ defense lawyer, particularly in the Khobar bombing case.  (See: Exclusive-Part 5: Freeh Became "Defence Lawyer" for Saudis on Khobar) Defense from what?  That question posits that the Saudis need to be defended against the perceptions or conclusions respecting their own culpability as they supported terrorism, including their own acts that very likely were, in ways, truly responsible for the Khobar bombing.

Nevertheless, the goals of Freeh's FBI may have themselves been served: Porter notes that Freeh testified before a joint hearing of the House and Senate Select Intelligence Committees that Prince Bandar bin Sultan was "critical in achieving the FBI’s investigative objectives in the Khobar case."

While Porter starts his Part 5 article by describing the acceptance by an FBI team (a team that Freeh sent to Saudi Arabia in 1998) of the confessions to the Khobar bombing of eight men from the Minority Shia sect whom the Saudis held, he shows how suspect those confessions were.  He details another case where “four British citizens, one Canadian and one Belgian had confessed” to three car bombings in Riyadh.  He recites in excruciating detail how the falsehoods of these Riyadh bombing confessions were systematically tortured out of these individuals to match a prewritten Saudi interrogation script.

Porter argues that with “blatant pro-Saudi bias” Freeh “effectively shut down” the probe of the Khobar bombing, pushing “a seriously flawed Saudi account of the bombing . . . tainted by the likelihood of torture.”

Louis Freeh’s seemingly intentional obtuseness in terms of appropriately discerning information about Saudi Arabia and its culpability comes up again in terms of his relationship with counterterrorism chief John O’Neill. O’Neill is referred to above as being the subject of Frontline’s “The Man Who Knew",” and O’Neill’s being pushed out of the FBI by Freeh.

O’Neill and Freeh get mentioned in a 2011 Vanity Fair article by Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan.  The article was about what was included in Congress’s Joint Inquiry (and then for a long time censored and withheld from release) about the connections between Saudi Arabia and the 9/11 hijackers and how the U.S. government buried and ignored evidence with respect thereto.  The article asks many good questions although some may almost inevitably head off in the direction of false leads.

The article recounts:
On a flight home from Saudi Arabia in the late 1990s [i.e. around the time of the Khobar bombing investigation], F.B.I. director Louis Freeh told counterterrorism chief John O’Neill that he thought the Saudi officials they had met during the trip had been helpful. “You’ve got to be kidding,” retorted O’Neill, a New Jersey native who never minced his words. “They didn’t give us anything. They were just shining sunshine up your ass.”
The article goes on to say that O’Neill continued to be openly frustrated that “all the answers, all the clues that could enable us to dismantle Osama bin Laden’s organization,” remained out of reach because they “are in Saudi Arabia.”

We can't get O’Neill's own version of this story now or any of his thinking, including about the Khobar bombing, because, in one of the bizarrely peculiar aspects of the 9/11 story, O’Neill was in the towers and reported killed on 9/11.  He had just taken a job there as head of security.

But to go back to Robert Mueller; that's who we started with when we began this tour reviewing the FBI/Saudi Khobar Towers bombing investigation.  It's where we must end too: Robert Mueller took over where Louis Freeh left off to bring the matter to it unsatisfactory conclusion.

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